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Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Supreme Court Clerk
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE:

Colman v. Utah State Land Board, No. 860331
Reply to State Respondents' Third Citation of New
Authority

Dear Mr. Butler:
This letter is submitted in response to the State's
third citation of new authority in accordance with rule 24(j)
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
The State has cited the Court to the California
Appeals Court decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d
1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 898 (Cal. App. 1989) in support of its
position that, as a matter of law, Colman has not stated a
claim for a taking of private property. This decision, which
is the result of the Supreme Court's remand, adds nothing to
the arguments previously presented by the parties in Colman.
In First English, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)
the United States Supreme Court addressed two issues. First,
the Court held that monetary damages can be sought for inverse
condemnation based on unconstitutional regulatory takings.
Second, and more important for this case, the Supreme Court
held that a temporary taking is compensable under the just
compensation clause. 107 S. Ct. at 3141. The Supreme Court
remanded the case for the California courts to determine
whether the temporary land use regulation at issue resulted in
a temporary taking of the plaintiff's property.
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On remand, the California Court of Appeals held that
there was no taking because the regulation did not deprive the
plaintiff of "all use" of its property. First English (Cal.),
258 Cal Rptr. at 904-05. The court found that the plaintiff
was left with several of its contemplated uses throughout the
term of the interim ordinance challenged by the plaintiff. Id.
at 904.
Colman's factual basis for a taking is substantially
different than First English. First, the Lutheran Church in
First English alleged a regulatory taking. Colman, however,
alleges a physical occupation of his property, which is a
taking per se. Colman's Supp. Brief at 36. Alternatively,
Colman alleges that he has been deprived of all beneficial use
of his property. Colman's Supp. Brief at 37-38.
The record in this case does not provide a basis for
this Court ruling that Colman has not been deprived of all use
of his land as he alleges. Physical occupation or deprivation
of all beneficial use of the property, even if only temporary,
is a compensable taking. Colman Supp. Brief at 36-38. The
determination of whether there is a "physical invasion,"
"substantial impairment" or "peculiar injury" constituting a
compensable taking is a question of fact for the trial court.
Colman Supp. Brief at 23-24. The California Appeals Court
decision in First English does not alter this conclusion nor
provide a basis for this court ruling that Colman has not
stated a claim as a matter of law.
Although the California court may have correctly ruled
that there was no taking in First English because the plaintiff
was not deprived of its beneficial use of the property, the
court's discussion is questionable in two respects. First, the
California court has, like many others, confused the state's
police power and eminent domain power. See Colman's Supp.
Brief at 8-13. As the State points out in its letter, the
California court stated that the disputed "zoning restrictions
represent a valid exercise of police power and not an
unconstitutional 'taking without compensation.'" The validity
of the exercise of the state's police power is a question of
due process, not just compensation. A proper exercise of the
police power (e.g. a valid regulation), however, may still
require compensation under the taking clause:
[A] basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment
makes clear that it is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the
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event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking. First English, 107 S. Ct. at
2384-85; Colman's Supp. Brief at 12.
Colman does not claim that the State's decision to
breach the causeway was an invalid exercise of its police power
in violation of the due process clause. His claim is that this
otherwise proper interference with his property requires
compensation under the just compensation clause of the Utah and
United States Constitutions.
Second, the California First English case suggests
that the State can take property without just compensation to
the extent that the regulation is necessary to preserve public
safety. Because the California court held that plaintiff was
not deprived of all use of its property, this statement is
dicta. (For an analysis of the public safety and emergency
argument, please see Colman's Supp. Brief at 46-50.) It is
important to note that the public safety rationale approved by
the court was the protection of human lives, not property.
First English (Cal.), 258 Cal. Rptr. at 895, 901-02. In
Colman, the State breached the causeway to protect property,
not human life. Finally, the California court specifically
found that First English presented a "dramatic illustration of
the principle of 'reciprocity of advantage'" iQ. at 905. No
such reciprocity is present in Colman. Colman Supp. Brief at
35-36.
For these reasons, and as more fully set forth in
Colman's Supplemental Brief, the trial court's ruling that
there was no taking in Colman should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.

Carol Clawson
cc:
0865c

R. Douglas Credille, Esq.
L. Ridd Larson, Esq.

